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ABSTRACT 
This paper estimates participation and wage equations using panel data from 
the United Kingdom to explore gender differences in urban wage and participation 
premiums.  The results suggest a small but economically significant urban 
participation premium for women but none for men.  Results from the wage 
estimations suggest that after controlling for sample selectivity, observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity, the urban premium is larger for women.  This wage 
premium is also larger for married or cohabiting women relative to others. There is 
also evidence of higher urban returns to experience for men and lower urban wage 
depreciation for both men and women. 
 
Keywords.  Participation, wages, urban, rural, panel, sample selection.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Recent evidence suggests that various types of agglomeration externalities are 
important in explaining the observed urban wage premium.  Wheaton and Lewis [33] 
find evidence of increasing urban wages consistent with increasing firm level returns 
and greater specialization of labor in denser urban markets.  Glaeser and Maré [10] 
find a robust urban wage premium and show that rural-urban migrants experience 
higher wage growth consistent with greater learning spillovers in urban areas. 
Wheeler [34] provides empirical support for a model where larger labor market size 
increases job match quality, individual productivity and wages.    
While the recent literature has explored how agglomeration influences the 
urban wage premium, there has been little consideration of whether these externalities 
impact differently on women and men.   There are a number of reasons why such 
gender differences might exist.  First, empirical evidence suggests that women are less 
spatially mobile than men, with job search conducted over a smaller area than men 
(Madden and Chiu [19]).  In denser urban labor markets, improved urban job 
matching may counterbalance this reduced mobility and hence, one might expect that 
any urban wage premium would be larger for women than men.  Second, women 
typically work fewer hours and years over their working lives and have a higher rate 
of job turnover than men (Altonji and Blank [2]).  Such career interruptions are likely 
to reduce the effect of improved learning spillovers in urban markets and hence may 
reduce any urban wage growth effect.  On the other hand, the more interrupted nature 
of female work histories may mean that women particularly benefit from improved 
urban job matching.  As a result, the extent of wage depreciation suffered by women 
during periods out of employment may be less in denser urban markets.   
By increasing the offered wage for any given individual, agglomeration effects 
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on wages should also increase labor market participation.  However, other density 
effects, especially on female participation, are also possible.   In particular, population 
density allows greater provision of certain services, e.g. childcare provision, the 
availability of which are particularly likely to reduce the reservation wages of women.   
Indeed, female participation rates in urban areas in developed countries have been 
consistently higher than those observed in rural areas (Stabler [28]), while the lack of 
childcare facilities and access to transport are frequently cited as barriers to women 
accepting employment in rural areas (Porterfield [23], Lichter et al. [17], Monk and 
Hodge [21]).   
This paper explores gender differences in both urban wage and participation 
premiums using panel data from the United Kingdom.  Specifically, using the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), participation and wage equations are estimated for 
samples of urban and rural women and men and the extent of any urban premiums 
calculated. Differences in the structure of wages and participation are considered by 
testing for urban-rural differences in the impact of explanatory variables for women 
and men.   
Higher urban wages and participation may also reflect living costs, differences 
in abilities, job characteristics or lower preferences for urban amenity  (Roback [26],  
Hwang et al [14])   Therefore, when trying to identify agglomeration effects it is 
important to account for observed and unobserved differences in such factors.  While 
many previous studies have been able to control for observed differences, their ability 
to control for unobserved differences in these factors has often been limited because 
the appropriate data was cross-sectional only (Wheeler [34], Wheaton and Lewis 
[33]).   However, the availability of panel data does allow the estimation of models 
accounting for such unobserved differences or heterogeneity.  For example Glaeser 
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and Maré [10] used a fixed effects estimator to identify the male urban wage premium 
while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.    
This approach is less attractive if sample selection effects are important, as the 
fixed effects estimator is inconsistent if these effects vary with time (Verbeek and 
Nijman [32]).  Clearly, the interrupted nature of female labor market participation 
means sample selection effects should be taken into account when considering the 
female urban wage premium.   The fixed effect estimator also relies on urban-
rural/rural-urban migrants for identification of the wage premium.   This means that it 
is unsuitable if there are insufficient numbers of such migrants for credible estimation. 
For similar reasons, in this approach it is particularly difficult to identify urban-rural 
differences in parameters for explanatory variables such as education where there is 
little variation over time at the individual level.  
Therefore, to account for sample selection and unobserved heterogeneity, 
while allowing urban-rural differences in the impact of explanatory variables to be 
identified, the panel sample selection model suggested by Vella and Verbeek [31] and 
Nijman and Verbeek [22] is estimated.  In this model the correlation between 
unobserved components in the wage and participation equations controls for 
traditional sample selection effects and unobserved heterogeneity across all 
individuals.   The identification of any urban premiums in this model does not rely on 
migrants but uses all available wage information.   
The main results are as follows.  There is evidence of a small but economically 
significant urban participation premium for women of around 3%.  In contrast, there 
appears to be no economically significant participation premium for men.  There is 
also evidence of gender differences in the structure of the urban wage premium. In 
particular, urban women experience lower wage depreciation associated with time out 
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of the labor force, but their returns to experience are no higher.  In contrast, there is 
evidence of both lower wage depreciation and higher returns to experience for urban 
men.  The source of the female urban participation premium is difficult to determine.  
However, the urban wage premiums found are consistent with the hypothesis that 
those with lower spatial mobility are more disadvantaged in less dense labor markets, 
with for example, the wage premium substantially lower for single women than for 
those who are married or cohabiting.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses in more detail the 
source and empirical implications of possible gender differences in agglomeration 
effects. Section III describes the data, the definitions used and provides some basic 
descriptive analysis.  Section IV discusses the econometric specification, discussion 
of hypotheses and model estimation. Section V presents the results. Section VI 
concludes.  
II. BACKGROUND 
The various mechanisms through which agglomeration can increase wages (and 
participation) are likely to affect gender differences in a number of different ways.  
Arguably, agglomeration externalities that occur primarily at the firm level, are 
unlikely to induce large gender differentials.  For example if urban firms are more 
productive because of lower set-up or transport costs, or through increased 
informational spillovers (Krugman [16], Glaeser [8]) there should be no gender 
differential as long as women and men are equally likely to be found in firms where 
such effects are important.  
 In contrast, agglomeration effects which accrue to the individual are more 
likely to be associated with gender differences.  For example, because of the greater 
number of contacts between individuals, informal learning is likely to be greater in 
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urban areas and individual productivity and wages in urban areas may grow faster as a 
result (Glaeser [9], Rauch [25]).   However, women have historically had lower labor 
market attachment, higher job turnover, and have received less training than men 
(Altonji and Blank [2]).  If learning spillovers increase the rate of human capital 
formation, the interrupted nature of the typical female work history and lower levels 
of training mean that urban women are likely to gain less from such spillovers than 
men and hence wage growth effects may be less evident for women.  
On the other hand, women are likely to gain significantly from better job 
matching in denser markets.  Various models predict higher wages and growth if the 
quality of job matching improves in urban markets.  For example, Hesley and Strange 
[13] illustrate how agglomeration itself can be driven by increasing expected urban 
match quality, while Wheeler [34] shows how decreasing search costs lead to more 
productive matches, increased sorting and wages in urban labor markets.   Evidence 
suggests that women are less spatially mobile than men, with job search conducted 
over a smaller area than men (Madden and Chiu [19]).  Hence, denser markets and 
better job matching may counterbalance this reduced mobility.  Further, improved 
urban job matching should also reduce the wage depreciation associated with periods 
out of the labor force (Mincer and Ofek [20]).   The more interrupted nature of female 
work patterns should mean that this type of effect will be particularly important for 
women.   
Although the evidence is mixed, a number of authors have argued that returns 
to education will be higher in denser markets.   Possible gender effects in such 
education differentials are perhaps rather ambiguous.  For example, Rauch [25] argues 
that higher returns to education in urban areas arise because the transmission of ideas 
is likely to improve with higher levels of human capital.  Hence, these spillovers may 
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be larger in urban areas where average education levels are higher.  Such effects, 
which are external to the individuals, are unlikely to induce gender differences.  
However, Frank [7] argues that overeducation effects are more likely in less dense 
markets and that such effects are more likely to affect the ‘second’ earner in the 
household, i.e. typically women. In this case, any increase in the return to education 
associated with denser markets might well be larger for women.  
If market size increases wages it should also increase participation for 
identical individuals.  Moreover, if the female urban wage premium is larger, any 
associated increased participation effect should also be higher for women.  Finally, 
the effect of population density on service provision may also tend to exacerbate any 
gender difference in the urban participation premium.  In particular, in areas of low 
population density, access to services such as transport, housing and childcare, may be 
more difficult.  If they exist, such barriers to employment are likely to impact 
differentially on women, increasing their reservation wages and hence further 
reducing female participation in low density areas (Porterfield [23], Lichter et al [17], 
Monk and Hodge [21]). 
 In summary, the previous discussion suggests a number of general hypotheses 
concerning the nature of possible gender differences in urban wage and participation 
premiums.   First, if agglomeration effects are only felt at the firm level, the urban 
wage premium is likely to be similar for both sexes.  In contrast, where job matching 
effects are important, the urban wage premium may be larger for women as denser 
markets counterbalance the effect of their smaller job search area.   Further, the urban 
wage premium should, as a result, be larger for certain groups whose spatial mobility 
is likely to be particularly restricted, e.g. married women.   
Learning spillover and job matching effects are both likely to be important in 
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the male urban wage premium.  However, the interrupted nature of their work 
histories means that job matching effects, e.g. through lower wage depreciation, are 
likely to be relatively more important than learning spillover effects for women.  In 
contrast, it is more difficult to make predictions whether, if they exist, higher urban 
returns to education should vary by gender.  Finally, any larger female urban wage 
premium should also imply a larger urban participation premium for women.  This 
differential may also be exacerbated by higher service provision in denser urban areas.     
III. DATA 
The data was drawn from the first eight waves 1991-1998 of the British Household 
Panel Survey, a longitudinal survey following some 10,000 individuals representative 
of the British population.  The labour market component of the survey has detailed 
information on individual earnings, hours worked, other individual characteristics and 
work histories from which standard measures of usual hourly earnings, highest 
education level attained, total experience and time out of the labour force can be 
calculated (see the footnote to Table 1 for details on definitions).   
Unlike in the United States there is no single accepted definition of what 
constitutes a (dense) metropolitan area in the UK. However, additional information 
made available by UK Institute for Social and Economic Research, made it possible to 
split the sample into urban and rural residents based on place of residence consistent 
with those definitions used by policy makers.  Specifically, in England, Local 
Authority Districts are classified into Remote Rural, Accessible Rural, Coalfield 
areas, Urban and Metropolitan (Cabinet Office [4], Tarling et al [29]).   For Scotland 
and Wales, rural Local Authority Districts are identified using the Randall definition, 
where population density in the district is less than one person per hectare, and then 
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rural districts are classified as remote or accessible rural depending on their proximity 
to urban centers (Scottish Office [27]).   
While these definitions do not allow the examination of city size effects, it is 
argued that the contrast between urban and rural samples can still be exploited to 
identify agglomeration effects.  To ensure those in the rural sample are resident in 
areas characterized by population scarcity and distance from urban centers (Cabinet 
Office [4]), it is important to exclude those living in rural areas but within commuting 
distance to urban centers.  Hence, the rural sample consists only of those individuals 
resident in remoter rural districts only, while the urban sample includes only those 
resident in districts defined to be urban and metropolitan.    
To estimate the sample selection model specified in the next section requires 
at least three (consecutive) observations for each individual in the sample.  To 
maximize the use of the available data and in particular to ensure adequate rural 
observations, an unbalanced panel was constructed from the rural and urban samples 
of individuals interviewed in three or more consecutive waves. For each individual, 
only information from one set of consecutive interviews was used.  Hence, if data was 
missing in a given wave, only the information from the longest set of consecutive of 
interviews was included for that individual.  This procedure resulted in repeated 
observations on 2177 women, of which 1040 were observed in all eight waves, and 
1626 repeated male observations, with 565 observed in all eight waves.  Moves 
between urban and rural locations are extremely rare in the data, with 71 total moves 
for women and only 48 total moves for men in either direction. 
Table 1 reports key summary statistics for the urban and rural samples by 
gender.  As expected, the Table shows higher urban participation rates and wages for 
both sexes.  The urban-rural differences in participation rates are rather similar for 
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women and men, i.e. 4 and 3 percent respectively.  However, the female urban wage 
premium at 15 percent is significantly larger than the male urban-rural difference at 8 
percent.  Apart from a few exceptions, e.g. a lower proportion of married or 
cohabiting urban women, a higher proportion of urban men with a degree, most of the 
characteristics appear similar across the urban and rural samples.   
IV. MODEL  
Urban premiums in wages and participation may arise from differences in observed 
and unobserved individual characteristics or in differences in the impact of given 
explanatory variables on an individual’s wages and participation probability.    The 
following model captures both types of effect.   First, consider the offered wage 
equation  
(1) , i=1,..,N , t=1,..,  iti
rr
it
uu
itit exxw +++= αββ iT 1
where  represents the potential offered (log) wage of individual i in time t,  
(k=u,r) is a vector of observed characteristics for the urban (u) and rural (r) samples 
( if individual i is not part of sample k),  are returns to these characteristics 
in the two samples, while 
itw
k
itx
0=kitx kβ
iα  and  are random components.  In the model estimated 
below  contains quadratic functions of each individual’s total experience and time 
out of the labor force, education dummies plus time and regional dummies. 
Differences in the structure of returns to characteristics across the two samples can be 
considered in equation (1) by testing whether the parameters  are identical.  
Unobserved heterogeneity across individuals in terms of cost of living, productivity, 
ite
k
itx
kβ
                                                          
1 In the empirical work, separate equations are estimated by gender. For brevity the specification 
described below does not explicitly distinguish between the sexes. 
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preference for amenity and other job characteristics, e.g. industry and occupation, is 
controlled for by the random effect term iα , while  accounts for other time varying 
random shocks.   
ite
Assume, as is standard, that an individual’s decision to work is determined by 
whether the offered wage is above their reservation wage, where both are influenced 
by observed and unobserved individual characteristics.  This implies a standard 
reduced form model for participation as a function of all the variables affecting both 
the reservation and offer wage plus any individual unobserved effect.   However, there 
is extensive evidence to suggest that even after accounting for individual 
heterogeneity, individuals also exhibit a considerable degree of persistence in their 
labor market state (Heckman [11], Hyslop [15]).  This suggests that the reduced form 
model should also allow for state dependence as follows 
(2)     iti
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r
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u
it zzyyy ηθδδδδ +++++= −− 111010*
(3)  )0( * >= itit yIy
where  is equal to one when individual  participates in period t,  is the latent 
variable which when positive implies the individual will participate,   are vectors 
containing the variables assumed to influence both offered and reservation wages for 
the urban (u) and rural (r) samples. The vector  captures the (net) effects of the 
variables in the reservation and offered wage functions by location.   In the 
specification below,  contains all the explanatory variables used in  plus a set of 
demographic and other variables, including martial status, number and age of children 
and non-labor income.  The extent of state dependence or persistence in participation 
is captured by the presence of the lagged participation variables  (equal to one if 
the individual was working in the previous period and resident in location k).  
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*
ity
k
itz
u
1δ
k
itz
k
itx
k
ity 1−
 14
Unobserved heterogeneity is captured by iθ  while itη  is pure random component.   
The model is completed by assuming that the error terms are jointly normally 
distributed with zero means and constant variances.  The sample selection problem 
induced by the potential correlation between unobserved components in the 
participation and wage equations can then be incorporated by allowing for non-zero 
covariances between the random effects in the iα  and iθ , and between the two shocks 
 and ite itη .  All other covariances between elements of the error terms are assumed 
zero.2  
 Testing Urban-Rural Differences  
The sources of possible gender differences in urban wage and participation premiums 
suggest a number of differences in the urban and rural coefficients in equations (1) 
and (2).  First, as Glaeser and Maré [10] note, firm level agglomeration effects imply 
an urban wage level effect. Hence, any wage premium for both sexes should disappear 
once observed and unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for, i.e.  
should not be rejected in equation (1).  Moreover, if an urban wage premium is 
observed it should not differ significantly by gender.  In contrast, job matching effects 
should mean any overall urban wage premium is larger for women, and that this 
premium will be greater in samples where spatial mobility is thought to be lower.    
ru
o ββH =:
Both learning spillover effects and improved job matching effects should 
increase urban wage growth.  However improved job matching effects may also 
decrease wage depreciation associated with time out of the labor force.  Disentangling 
these effects is obviously difficult. However, the lack of urban-rural mobility does 
                                                          
2  The sample selection model controls for labor market participation but not the potential endogeneity 
of location.  However, informal tests using sub-samples of  ‘less mobile’ individuals, e.g. those with 
lower education levels, indicate that the results are robust to this limitation. 
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suggest that that any urban premium in wage growth and/or reduced wage 
depreciation should be reasonably reflected in the different estimates of returns to 
experience and wage losses associated with time out of the labor force.  For example, 
if improved job matching effects are more important for women than learning 
spillovers, any urban wage growth effect captured through increased returns to 
experience should be less important than any reduced urban wage depreciation effect.   
 There are no clearcut predictions as to whether there will be any difference in 
any urban educational premium by gender.  However, any such effects will be 
captured by differences in the coefficients reflecting returns to education in the wage 
equation (1).  
 Any urban impacts on returns to experience, wage depreciation and education 
will also affect the coefficients in the participation equation.  As these variables may 
also affect the reservation wage, differences in these coefficients are more difficult to 
interpret directly.   However, after accounting for other factors, the impact of a higher 
female urban wage premium should mean a greater urban female participation effect.     
The other hypothesized participation effects that can be captured by equation 
(3) are also likely to reinforce any higher urban female participation effect.  In 
particular, if population density effects on childcare service provision are important, 
the consequent increase in reservation wages may be lower for urban women. Hence, 
the urban coefficients capturing the overall impact of children on participation on 
women should be less negative than the rural ones.  
Econometric Implementation  
Estimation of the wage and participation equations poses a number of econometric 
problems.  As specified, the estimation model would need to assume that the random 
effect iθ  is independent of .  This assumption is not tenable for a number of the itz
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explanatory variables.  This poses a problem as, if this assumption is violated, the 
estimated coefficients will not correctly identify the marginal impacts of the time 
varying independent variables.  The standard approach to control for this is to model 
the random effect iθ  as a function of all the independent variables in all time periods 
(Chamberlain [5]) or, slightly more restrictively, as a simple function of the individual 
level means of the independent variables (Arulampalam et al [3]).  This latter 
approach is followed here.  Hence,  
(4)  i
rr
i
uu
ii zz µφφθ ++=   
where iµ  is assumed independent of  and the correlations between the original 
random effect and the regressors may vary by location.
k
itz
3   
After substitution of (4) in (2), the estimation of the resulting participation and 
wage equations is undertaken using the two-step procedure suggested by Nijman and 
Verbeek [22]), and Vella and Verbeek [31]).  In the first step, estimates of the 
parameters in the participation equation (2) are obtained from a dynamic Random 
Effects probit.  One additional problem is that the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity iµ  in conjunction with lagged participation  induces an initial 
conditions problem, where the initial observation  will be correlated with the 
unobserved random effect and hence maximum likelihood will produce inconsistent 
estimates.  This is addressed using the suggestion of Heckman [12], where a reduced 
form equation is specified for the initial period, where the error term from this 
equation is assumed correlated to the unobserved random effects.   
1−ity
0ity
                                                          
3 One problem of this approach is that significant collinearity problems may be induced between the 
additional regressors and the original independent variables. Hence, in the empirical work only a subset 
of the independent variables are used, i.e. those with sufficient variation within the panel.   
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(5) oiitit zy ελ += 00  
where  is a vector of strictly exogenous variables, 0itz oiε  is the error term, where this 
error and the random effect iµ  are correlated.   
The second step of the estimation procedure is an extension of the standard 
Heckman approach dealing with sample selection.   Consider the conditional 
expectation of equation (1), conditional on the , the vector of all participation states 
observed for individual i,  
iy
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As the errors are assumed to be drawn from a multivariate normal distribution, the 
conditional expectations )|( ii yE α  and  are linear functions of the 
covariances 
)|( iit yeE
αµσ  and  ησ e .  Specifically, Verbeek and Nijman [32] show that  
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where is the number of periods an individual is observed   
( ) ,  if i observed in period s, 0 otherwise), and 
∑ == Ts isi aT 1
(max ii TT = 1=isa αµσ  ησ e  are the 
covariances between the random effects and error terms respectively.  It can be shown 
that the bracketed terms on the right hand side of (7) and (8) are functions of the 
parameters in the participation equation only.  Hence, as in the standard Heckman 
case, once estimates of the participation parameters have been obtained, estimates of 
these correction terms can be obtained via numerical integration.  Then equation (6) 
can be estimated including the two correction terms using OLS, where standard errors 
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are adjusted to allow for the estimated nature of the correction terms.  The coefficients 
provide estimates of αµσ  and ησ e , and therefore the significance of these two 
coefficients provides a test for the importance of sample selection effects. 
 In principle, the error assumptions identify all the parameters in the offered 
wage equation as the selection terms are non-linear functions of the exogenous 
variables.  However as Vella [30] notes, the degree of the non-linearity in the 
selection terms may be limited given the actual range of values of the regressors.  
Hence, further exclusion restrictions are desirable.   Here, a number of variables are 
excluded from the wage equation, namely, the demographic variables and non-labor 
income, plus the lagged participation value.  It is often argued that household 
demographic variables should be included to capture unobserved motivational factors.   
Here such factors are controlled for by the unobserved heterogeneity.  Even without 
these restrictions, the wage regression coefficients can be identified by the exclusion 
of the lagged participation variable. 4
V. RESULTS  
Participation  
The results of the estimation of the participation equation for women and men are 
reported in Tables 2 and 3 respectively.  For comparative purposes each Table also 
reports (in Columns 1 and 2) the results from a simple static Random Effects probit 
with no adjustment for potential correlations between the regressors and the random 
effect.  The urban and rural estimates from the full dynamic model (equations (2)-(4)) 
are reported in columns 3 and 4 respectively.   Hence, comparing across the two 
specifications shows the impact on the participation estimates of allowing for 
                                                          
4 Experimentation showed that the results are robust to a variety of exclusion restrictions.  As an 
illustration of this a wage equation using alternative exclusion restrictions is reported in the Appendix. 
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dynamics and correlations between regressors and the random effects.  For brevity in 
all cases, the estimated coefficients on the regional and wave dummies are not 
reported. In the dynamic participation equation, the initial conditions equation 
estimates and the adjustment for correlated errors given by equation (4) are also 
omitted.  Unless otherwise indicated, the standard error is given in brackets below 
each estimated coefficient. 
The second section of Tables 2 and 3 reports the value of the inter-temporal 
correlation coefficient for the participation equations. The correlation coefficient ρˆ  is 
typically interpreted as the proportion of the variance unexplained by the regressors in 
the Random Effects probit and accounted for by variation between individuals 
(Arulampalam et al [3]).  The associated standard error indicates whether taking 
account of unobserved heterogeneity in the participation equation is important.  
Consistent with previous studies, this correlation is significant for all specifications in 
both Tables 2 and 3.  
In the final panel of the Tables, a number of estimation evaluation measures 
are reported.   For all estimations, the hypothesis that all coefficients are zero is 
strongly rejected. Further, consistent with the existence of urban density effects, the 
hypotheses that all the urban and rural coefficients are identical 
( ) is rejected at 5 percent significance for all cases, except for 
the dynamic model in the female sample.  Here, this hypothesis is rejected at 10 
percent significance (p-value 0.056).   
ruru
oH 1100 ,: δδδδ ==
Finally, the urban participation premium is reported at bottom of each Table.  
This is derived for each of the estimations as follows.  First, the urban and rural 
coefficient estimates are applied to the urban sample separately to generate two sets of 
individual participation probability predictions. The urban participation premium is 
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the difference between the average of the predictions obtained using the urban 
coefficients and the average obtained using the rural coefficients.  Formally, the 
average predicted probability from a random effects estimation represents the 
(conditional) probability that a randomly chosen individual will be observed 
participating (Arulampalam, et al [3]).  This premium can therefore be interpreted as 
the increase in the probability that a randomly chosen individual will participate if 
located in an urban area rather than a rural one.  As predicted, the implied urban 
participation premium for women is positive (0.028-0.031) and larger than for men.  
Indeed, for men the ‘premium’ is either negative (-0.0007) or extremely small (0.008). 
Turning to the coefficients for women presented in Table 2.  For the urban 
women estimates (columns 1 and 3), most are broadly in line with prior expectations.   
In both the static and dynamic specifications, the participation probability is strongly 
positively associated with education level, and negatively associated with time out of 
the labor force, pre-school children and non-labor income.   In the dynamic 
specification, the coefficient on the lagged participation variable is positive and 
significant.  The inclusion of this variable substantially decreases the proportion of the 
unexplained variance attributed to individual heterogeneity.  A number of the 
estimated coefficients also change substantially between the static and dynamic 
specification.  For example, the marginal impact of total actual experience is now 
apparently negative (although insignificant), the education coefficients now exhibit a 
more distinct pattern, with increasing education associated more clearly with 
increasing participation probability, while the marginal negative impact of young 
children is much reduced.  This latter result is consistent with the probability of 
women having children being correlated with preferences for not working.  The 
majority of the rural coefficients are of same sign as the urban ones, with the 
 21
education coefficients being a notable exception. However, unsurprisingly given the 
smaller underlying sample many of these coefficients are less well determined.   
  The coefficients on education, experience and time out of the labor force 
capture the effects of these variables on both offered and reservation wages.  Hence, 
clearcut conclusions in terms of urban density effects are difficult to draw from any 
urban-rural differences for these variables.  However, the main source of the rejection 
of the hypothesis that all the urban and rural coefficients are identical does appear to 
arise from the education variables. Two of the education variables are individually 
significantly different in both specifications, while the joint Wald test of equality of 
all education coefficients across the urban and rural samples is rejected in both the 
static and dynamic specifications. (p-values 0.004  and 0.028 respectively).   Overall 
the urban-rural differences in the experience variables and time out of the labor force 
do not exhibit clear differences across the urban and rural sample.  While the impact 
of all experience and time out of the labor force variables is statistically different 
across the two samples (p-value 0.020), this difference is not apparent in the dynamic 
specification.  
Because these variables appear in the participation model only, stronger 
interpretations are possible if urban-rural differences in the impact of children are 
observed.  For example, the marginal coefficients on young children are less negative 
for urban women in both specifications (consistent with lower urban reservation 
wages from better childcare provision). However, in neither the static or dynamic 
specification are these differences statistically significant, while the urban-rural 
differences in the coefficients on older children do not conform to this hypothesis.  
The Table 3 estimates for the male sample follow a rather similar pattern to 
the female sample.  Both urban and rural estimates generally follow prior 
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expectations.  Relative to the static model, the full dynamic specification with 
correlated regressors reduces the correlation coefficient ρˆ , while none of the 
variables reflecting number of children is statistically significant in this latter 
specification. Both urban and rural coefficients on the lagged participation variable 
are positive. In this case the urban coefficient is less than the rural one but this 
difference is not statistically significant.       
Although difficult to interpret in terms of urban density effects because they 
are net effects, the overall rejection of equality of the urban and rural coefficients does 
appear to arise from differing impacts of the experience and out of the labor force 
variables.  In the static specification, the equality of urban-rural coefficients of both 
the experience variables and the out of the labor force variables is rejected (p-values 
0.08 and 0.001 respectively). In the dynamic specification, although there are no 
individually significant differences, the test that both coefficients on the out of the 
labor force variables are equal across the samples is still rejected at 10 percent (p-
value 0.08).  In contrast to women, there is little evidence of urban education effects.  
Although the coefficient on one of the education dummies is significantly different in 
the dynamic case, the joint test that all education coefficients are identical cannot be 
rejected in either specification.  
Wages 
Tables 4 and 5 present the Sample Selection model wage equation estimates for 
women and men.   To provide an indication of the sensitivity of the results to the 
underlying assumptions used to identify this model, OLS and Fixed Effects wage 
equation results are also reported in these Tables.      In particular, the OLS results 
provide a simple way to judge the effects of allowing for sample selection and 
unobserved heterogeneity using the Sample Selection model.  In contrast, the Fixed 
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Effects model accounts for unobserved heterogeneity but not all types of sample 
selection and relies on migrants to identify the urban effects.  
There are two additional coefficients in the Sample Selection model associated 
with the two selection terms generated using the dynamic Random Effects Probit 
results in Tables 2 and 3.  These coefficients provide estimates of the covariance 
between the random effects, αµσ  and the covariance between the random shocks 
ησ e .5  The results indicate that sample selection is important for men and women.  
For both samples the estimate of αµσ  is positive, although it is only significant for 
women, while the estimates of ησ e  are negative and significant at 5% for both sexes. 6  
In the bottom panel of the Tables, a number of estimation evaluation measures 
are reported.   The tests that all coefficients are zero are strongly rejected in all 
specifications for both women and men.  The test of equality between all the urban 
and rural coefficients ( ) is also clearly rejected in the OLS and Sample 
Selection models in both Table 4 and 5.  However, the results for the Fixed Effects 
estimator are more ambiguous with little evidence to support the rejection of this 
hypothesis for women (p-value 0.129), while the test is rejected at the 10 percent level 
only for men.   
ru
o ββH =:
Finally, the implied urban wage premium is given for all specifications.   
                                                          
5 Unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for in the wage equation in the Sample Selection model if the 
covariance between the random effects in the wage and participation equations is non-zero.  
6 As the covariance between the two time-varying components of the participation and wage equation 
must be zero for the fixed effects estimator to be consistent, the significance of the second time varying 
selection term provides some evidence, conditional on the sample selection model’s identifying 
assumptions, to suggest that the fixed effects estimator may not be appropriate in this case.     
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These are calculated by applying the urban and rural coefficient estimates separately 
to the urban sample to generate two sets of individual predicted offer wages. The 
urban wage premium reported is the difference between the average of the offer wage 
predictions obtained using the urban estimates and the average obtained using the 
rural estimates. 
As with previous evidence by Glaeser and Maré [10], a positive urban wage 
premium remains for both women and men after controlling for both observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity.  Although firm level agglomeration effects imply an urban 
premium in wage levels, the unobserved heterogeneity, which allows each 
individual’s intercept to differ, should purge the observed premium of such effects.   
Hence, as an urban premium remains in both the Fixed Effects and Sample Selection 
models, this suggests that the premium is not simply a firm level effect.   Further, in 
all specifications the female urban wage premium is significantly larger than that for 
men, consistent with the hypothesis that improved job matching in denser urban areas 
is important in explaining higher urban wages.  
 Turning to the coefficient estimates in Table 4 and 5.  The OLS and Sample 
Selection models provide similar results that are consistent with prior expectations.   
For both men and women, the results for these models indicate that wages increase 
with experience and education level but decline with time out of the labor force.  
Consistent with previous evidence (Light and Ureta [18]), they also suggest that 
returns to experience and that wage depreciation are lower for women.  Returns to 
education below degree level also appear lower for women.   In contrast, the 
estimated coefficients for the Fixed Effects model are often poorly determined, 
particularly for variables such as education level where there is little time variation 
within individuals.   For example, the coefficients on the education variables do not 
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follow the expected pattern for either men or women, while only three of the sixteen 
education coefficients estimated are significant.  In addition, although the estimated 
coefficients have the expected signs neither time out of the labor force or its square 
are found to have a significant effect on wages for women in this model.    
 In the OLS and Sample Selection results, the source of urban-rural differences 
in wages are well determined and – apart from results for the education variables - 
consistent with prior hypotheses on potential gender differences.    For women, the 
estimates in Table 4 are similar across OLS and Sample Selection models.  They both 
indicate significant reduced wage depreciation in the urban sample consistent with 
improved job matching with the urban coefficients on time out of the labor force and 
time out of the labor force squared around half the rural estimates.   Further, the joint 
test of urban-rural equality of the two out of the labor force coefficients is rejected in 
both specifications (p-values <0.001).  On the other hand there is no evidence of 
higher urban returns to experience or to education.   Indeed, with respect to returns to 
education, there is some evidence that the returns to lower range qualifications are in 
fact higher in the rural sample.  In contrast, the results for the Fixed Effects model 
suggests that the lack of migrants in the data mean it is difficult to identify the source 
of any urban wage premium using this approach.  For example, only one of the 
differences between an individual urban and rural estimate is statistically significant, 
i.e. the effect of A-Levels.  
 The OLS and Sample Selection results for men in Table 5 indicate that urban 
wage depreciation associated with time out of the labor force is lower consistent with 
improved urban job matching. However, urban returns to experience for men are also 
significantly higher consistent with the existence of improved informal spillover 
effects.  Joint tests of the experience variables and the out of the labor force variables 
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strongly reject the hypotheses that these coefficients are identical across urban and 
rural samples in either the OLS or Sample Selection specification (p-values 0.024 and 
0.013 respectively).  As for women, there is no evidence of higher urban returns to 
education.  The results for the Fixed Effects model also indicate higher urban 
returns to experience for men.  However in this case, no significant urban-rural 
differences are found in the effect of time out of the labor force.  
Model Evaluation 
The ability of the Sample Selection model to identify the urban wage premium and 
control for selection and unobserved heterogeneity depends on a number of 
assumptions, e.g. joint normality of errors, independence between the error 
components and regressors in the wage equation, non-zero correlations between 
unobserved heterogeneity in participation and wage equations etc.   One apparent 
cause for concern is that, although the results indicate significant sample selection 
effects for men and women, the estimated coefficients from the sample selection 
model appear very close to the original OLS values.  Testing this formally using a 
Hausman test confirms that the hypothesis of equality of the two sets of coefficients 
cannot be rejected for men. For women there is evidence of significant differences in 
the coefficients (p-value <0.01), although in absolute terms these are rather small.   
This suggests that either the Sample Selection model does not account 
adequately for selection and unobserved heterogeneity, or that simply the biases 
associated with using OLS are limited in this particular case.   To further explore the 
effectiveness and validity of the Sample Selection model, the results are examined in 
two additional ways.  First, informal evidence on the strength of the selection effects 
is considered.  Second, as model misspecification induced by assumptions violations 
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should be reflected in the wage residuals, these are also used to test overall model 
validity.   
 In the simpler Heckman selection model, evidence from Monte Carlo studies 
indicates that the bias associated with using OLS when selection is present increases 
with the extent of censoring and the absolute magnitude of the correlation between the 
errors in the selection and primary equation (Puhani [24]; Zuehlke and Zeman [35]).  
Verbeek and Nijman [32] also present Monte Carlo evidence which suggests that the 
biases from not accounting for selection in the panel sample selection case increase 
with the absolute value of the correlations between iα  and iµ , and between  and ite
itη .     
From Table 1, the degree of censoring in the male wage sample is relative low, 
(14 and 17 percent for the urban and rural sub-samples respectively). Hence, in this 
case the difference between the Sample Selection model and OLS estimates might be 
expected to be small even when selection is relevant.  For women, the extent of 
censoring in the wage sample is larger (29 and 34 percent for the urban and rural sub-
samples respectively), and hence a priori significant bias in the OLS estimates appears 
more probable, with the extent of this bias likely to depend on the correlations 
between the error components in selection and primary equation.  Indicative estimates 
of the upper bounds of these correlations can be obtained from the Sample Selection 
model results as follows.  First, estimates of the variance of iµ  and itη  can be 
calculated from the Random Effects Probit results (under the normalization 
1)var()var( =+ iti ηµ ), while the wage equation coefficients on the two sample 
selection terms provide direct estimates of the error component covariances.    Finally, 
estimates of the conditional variances of iα  and  which, under the assumption of ite
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homoskedactity, are less than their unconditional values, can be obtained using 
appropriately defined residuals from the wage equation.    Using this method, the 
estimates of upper bound for the correlation between iα  and iµ  are 0.13 for women 
and 0.05 for men, and between  and ite itη  are -0.18 for women and –0.33 for men.   
At least for women, the estimated upper bound correlations are towards the lower 
values used in the Monte Carlo Studies where the extent of bias associated with OLS 
is relatively small (Puhani [24]).  While this evidence is only indicative, it does 
provide one possible explanation for the small observed differences between the 
Sample Selection and OLS estimates. That is, for men the low rate of censoring in the 
wage equation is a probable reason for the limited differences, while for women, the 
relatively low correlations between the unobserved error components may be limiting 
the extent of the underlying bias in the OLS results.  
The three estimation approaches used, i.e. OLS, Fixed Effects, and Sample 
Selection, also provide specific predictions about the behavior of the wage residuals.  
In particular, because OLS does not take account of unobserved heterogeneity, the 
unadjusted residuals from the OLS wage regressions should be strongly correlated for 
individuals.  In contrast, if the time varying sample selection effects are not important, 
Fixed Effects should control effectively for unobserved heterogeneity and the 
residuals in this model should be uncorrelated at the individual level.    Similarly, if 
the Sample Selection model does control effectively for unobserved heterogeneity 
through the correlation between the unobserved effects in the participation and wage 
equations, the unadjusted residuals from the Sample Selection wage regressions 
should also be uncorrelated at the individual level.    
The residuals ( )itu
) from each of the six wage estimations in Tables 4 and 5 are 
analyzed using techniques applied when examining the covariance of earnings 
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(Dickens [6], Abowd and Card [1]). First, within individual residual covariances are 
calculated and an estimate of the residual covariance matrix obtained. Second, from 
these matrices the average covariances by lag length are calculated.  These are 
reported in Table 6 for each wage regression.  Zero correlation in the residuals would 
mean that each of these covariances should not be statistically significant.  
Overall the results from Table 6 do not suggest serious underlying 
misspecification in the Sample Selection model.  Furthermore, they indicate that this 
model is more effective in eliminating correlation in the residuals in both the female 
and male wage estimations than either OLS or Fixed Effects approaches.  The 
reported OLS residual covariances are large and all strongly statistically significant 
for both sexes.  Although somewhat smaller than for the OLS estimation, all residual 
covariances beyond one lag remain statistically significant for both sexes in the Fixed 
Effects results.   In contrast, the covariances from the Sample Selection model are 
generally smaller, with only one individual covariance remaining statistically 
significant in each case.  
Spatial Mobility and Urban Participation-Wage Premiums  
The results reported in Table 3-5 provide evidence that urban participation and wage 
premiums are larger for women and that the structure of urban-rural differences in 
returns to experience and time out of the labor force differ by gender.  If the source of 
these differences is improved urban job matching effects, we would expect that the 
urban premium will be greater for groups where spatial mobility is thought 
particularly restricted. 
To explore this Table 7 reports the urban participation and wage premiums for 
a sub-sample thought a priori likely to be less spatially mobile, i.e. married and 
cohabiting individuals, and a sub-sample thought to be more mobile, i.e. unmarried 
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individuals. The results for the urban characteristics (columns 1 and 3) are calculated 
in the same way to the premiums presented in Tables 3-5, i.e. the urban and rural 
estimates are applied to the urban sample to provide two sets of predictions, with the 
urban premium equal to the average predicted value using the urban coefficients 
minus the average using the rural coefficients. In addition, the urban premiums 
obtained when the urban and rural coefficients are applied to the rural samples of men 
and women are also reported.  Each set of results reported in columns 1 to 4 is based 
on the estimation of a separate dynamic Random Effects participation probit and 
Sample Selection model wage regression for the appropriate sub-sample.  Similarly, 
the urban premiums calculated from the Fixed Effects wage regressions (columns 5 
and 6) are also results from separate regressions for each sub-sample. To provide a 
general indication as to the robustness of the urban premiums reported, the standard 
error of each urban premium is presented.  In addition, the result of the joint test that 
all urban and rural coefficients are identical in the model used to generate the 
predictions is also reported for each case.   
  The participation results provide little support for the hypothesis that the 
observed urban premium arises from differences in spatial mobility.  For women, the 
hypothesis that there are no urban-rural differences in the coefficients used to generate 
the results in Table 3 cannot be rejected for either sub-sample, while the calculated 
premiums are larger for those thought to be less spatially constrained, i.e. unmarried 
women. For men, the urban participation premiums are larger for the samples of 
married men but remain small.  
 In contrast, the urban wage premium results from the Sample Selection Model 
do provide further evidence that the urban-rural gender differences observed in Tables 
4 and 5 are driven by differences in spatial mobility.  First, the urban-rural differences 
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in estimated coefficients underlying the calculated premiums appear robust, with the 
hypothesis that the urban and rural coefficients are identical rejected (at 5 % 
significance) in all cases.  Second, the urban wage premium varies as predicted.  So 
although the urban wage premium does not disappear for single women, it is 
substantially lower than for the married/cohabiting sample.  For example, when the 
characteristics of rural single women are used the premium falls to 0.011 but rises to 
0.082 for the sample of rural married women.  Similarly, the wage premium is larger 
for married than single men.   
 The urban wage premium results based on the Fixed Effects estimations again 
underline the identification problems associated with this model, with the estimations 
failing in the sub-samples of single women and men.  Further, none of the reported the 
results for women is based on an estimation where the differences in urban and rural 
coefficients are statistically significant, while for men, the urban premiums across the 
sample of all men and the married sample exhibit considerable instability.   
 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
This paper has considered the extent of gender differences in both the urban wage and 
participation premiums using panel data from the United Kingdom.   Specifically, 
participation and wage equations were estimated for urban and rural women and men 
using a panel sample selection model, which controlled for observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity.  As the identification of the wage component of the model requires a 
number of relatively strong assumptions, e.g. joint normality of errors, the wage 
equation results were also compared with both OLS and Fixed Effects estimations.  
These comparisons showed that the Sample Selection estimator does provide an 
effective way in which to control for unobserved heterogeneity and sample selection 
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in cases where identification problems reduce the usefulness of Fixed Effects 
estimator.  
From the results, there is evidence of a small but economically significant 
urban participation premium for women.  In contrast, there appears to be no 
economically significant participation premium for men.  However, for both women 
and men there is evidence that participation structure differs in urban areas, although 
specific urban density effects are difficult to identify.   
In contrast, the wage regressions do suggest that urban density effects induce 
gender differences in wages.  Even after controlling for observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity, the urban premium is larger for women.  Further, consistent with 
hypothesis that higher urban market density counteracts the effects of lower spatial 
mobility, the urban wage premium for women was substantially larger for those who 
were married or cohabiting relative to those who were single. 
Finally, while there is no evidence of higher urban returns to experience, wage 
depreciation for women is appreciably lower in the urban sample.  In contrast, both 
higher returns to experience and lower wage depreciation help explain the male urban 
wage premium.  While not conclusive, these results do suggest that improved urban 
job matching effects are relatively more important in the female urban wage premium 
than learning spillover effects.   
The results indicate a number of possible questions for further research.  The 
urban-rural categorization used here is necessarily rather broad.  Are there different 
effects if a finer scale is available, e.g. are there city size effects? Also, the tests of the 
impact of higher service provision on participation applied are rather indirect.  Can 
measures be found which would allow such effects to be tested more fully, e.g. effects 
of differences in public transport provision?   
 33
REFERENCES 
[1] J. Abowd, D. Card, The Covariance Structure of Earnings and Hours Changes, 
Econometrica 57 (1989) 411-445.  
[2] J.G. Altonji, R. Blank, Race and Gender in the Labor Market, in: O.C. Ashenfelter 
and D. Card (Eds.) Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, North Holland, 
Amsterdam, 1999, pp. 3144-3260. 
[3] W. Arulampalam, A. Booth, M. Taylor, Unemployment persistence, Oxford 
Economic Papers 52 (2000) 24-54.   
[4] Cabinet Office, Rural Economies. Report of the Performance and Innovation Unit.  
HMSO, London 1999. 
[5] G. Chamberlain, Panel Data, in: Z.Griliches and Intriligator (Eds.), M. Handbook 
of Econometrics Vol. 2, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1984, pp.1247-1318. 
[6] R. Dickens, The Evolution of Individual Male Earnings in Great Britain: 1975-95, 
Economic Journal 110 (2000) 27-49. 
[7] R. Frank, Why Women earn less: The Theory and Estimation of Differential 
Overqualification, American Economic Review 68 (1978) 360-373. 
[8] E. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying, Journal of Economic Perspectives 12 (1998) 139-
160. 
[9] E. Glaeser, Learning in Cities, Journal of Urban Economics 46 (1999) 254-277. 
[10] E. Glaeser, D Maré, D Cities and Skills, Journal of Labor Economics 19 (2001) 
316-342. 
[11] J. Heckman, Heterogeneity and state dependence, in: S.Rosen (Ed.) Studies in 
Labor Markets, Chicago Press Chicago, 1981, pp.91-139. 
[12] J. Heckman, The incidental parameters problem and the problem of initial 
conditions in estimating a discrete-time-discrete-data stochastic process, in: C.F. 
 34
Manski, D., McFadden (Eds.), Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with 
Econometric Applications. MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1981, pp.114-78. 
[13] R. Hesley, W. Strange, Matching and agglomeration economies in a system of 
cities, Regional Science and Urban Economics 20 (1990) 189-212. 
[14] H. Hwang, W. Reed, C. Hubbard, Compensating Wage Differentials and 
Unobserved Productivity, Journal of Political Economy 100 (1992) 835-858.  
[15] D. Hyslop, State dependence, serial correlation and heterogeneity in 
intertemporal labor force participation of married women, Econometrica 67 
(1999) 1255-1294.  
[16] P. Krugman, Geography and Trade, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1991.  
[17] D. Lichter, G. Johnson, D. McLaughlin, Changing linkages between work and 
poverty in Rural America, Rural Sociology 59 (1994) 395-415.   
[18] A. Light, M. Ureta, Early-Career Work Experience and Gender Wage 
Differentials, Journal of Labor Economics  13 (1995) 121-154.  
[19] J. Madden, L. Chiu, The Wage Effects of Residential Location and Commuting 
Constraints on Employed Married-women, Urban Studies 27 (1990) 353-369.  
[20] J. Mincer, H. Ofek, Interrupted work careers: Depreciation and Restoration of 
Human Capital, Journal of Human Resources 17 (1982) 1-24.   
[21] S. Monk, I  Hodge, Labour markets and employment opportunities in rural 
Britain Sociologia Ruralis, 35 (1995) 153-172. 
[22] T. Nijman, M. Verbeek, Nonresponse in panel data: The impact on estimates of a 
life cycle consumption function, Journal of Applied Econometrics 7 (1992) 243-
157. 
[23] S. Porterfield, On the precipice of reform: welfare spell durations for rural female 
headed families, American Journal Agricultural Economics 80 (1998) 994-999. 
 35
[24] P.A. Puhani, The Heckman Correction for Sample Selection and its Critique, 
Journal of Economic Surveys 14 (2000) 53-67. 
[25] J. Rauch, Productivity Gains from Geographic Concentration of Human Capital: 
Evidence from the Cities, Journal of Urban Economics 34 (1993) 380-400. 
[26] J. Roback, Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life, Journal of Political Economy 
90 (1982) 1257-78. 
[27] Scottish Office, Towards a development strategy for Rural Scotland. A 
discussion paper.  Scottish Office, Edinburgh 1997. 
[28] J. Stabler, Rural America: a challenge to regional scientists, Annals of Regional 
Science 33 (1999) 1-14. 
[29] R. Tarling, J. Rhodes, J. North, G. Broom, The Economy and Rural England, 
Rural Development Commission, London 1993.  
[30] F. Vella, Estimating Models with Sample Selection Bias: A Survey, Journal of 
Human Resources 33  (1998) 127-169.   
[31] F. Vella, M Verbeek, Two-step estimation of panel data models with censored 
endogenous variables and selection bias, Journal of Econometrics, 90 (1999) 
239-263. 
[32] M. Verbeek, T. Nijman, Testing for selectivity bias in panel data models, 
International Economic Review 33  (1992) 681-703.  
[33] W.C. Wheaton, M.J. Lewis, Urban wages and labor market agglomeration, 
Journal of Urban Economics 51 (2002) 542-562.   
[34] C.H. Wheeler, Search, Sorting and Urban Agglomeration, Journal of Labor 
Economics 19 (2001) 879-899.  
[35] T.W. Zuehlke, A.R. Zeman, A Comparison of Two-stage Estimators of Censored 
Regression Models, Review of Economics and Statistics 73 (1991) 185-188. 
 36
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Means  
 Women Men 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural 
     
Working 0.71 0.66 0.86 0.83
eLog (wage)* 1.58 1.43 1.83 1.75
   
Work Experience   
Total actual experience (years) 14.40 14.43 18.18 19.55
Total time out of labor force (years) 7.03 7.93 2.15 2.17
   
Highest Education Level Attained   
O-levels or equivalent 0.37 0.38 0.28 0.28
A-levels or  equivalents 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.11
Nursing or other higher qualifications 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.30
Degree plus  0.13 0.11 0.17 0.11
   
Children   
Number Children < 5 years of age  0.23 0.24 0.19 0.21
Number Children 5 –11 years of age 0.38 0.40 0.31 0.34
Number Children 12–16 years of age 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.21
   
Other   
Married or cohabiting 0.73 0.81 0.71 0.74
Non-labor income £000 3.14 3.35 2.73 2.95
   
Total Individuals  1918 259 1430 196
Total Observations  11968 1717 8533 1213
 
* Wages are usual monthly labor earnings divided by usual hours worked with an adjustment factor of 
1.5 for overtime hours. Total Experience is years in full or part-time employment constructed from the 
work history files. Out of the labor force is years unemployed or out of the labor force constructed 
from the work history files. O-levels (and equivalent) are national examinations taken in up to 10 
subjects by students normally at the end of compulsory schooling at 16.   A-levels are national 
examinations typically taken in up to 3 subjects by students aged 18.  Results from both types of 
examinations are graded and are used as the basis for acceptance at College or University. 
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Table 2: Female Participation Estimates 
  Static  Dynamic 
    Urban Rural   Urban Rural 
Constant  0.608 0.941  0.088 0.418 
  (0.172) (0.396)  (0.224) (0.437) 
Lagged working     1.150 1.139 
     (0.066) (0.146) 
Experience  0.236 0.229 -0.004 -0.056 
  (0.014) (0.029) (0.044) (0.071) 
Experience squared  -0.0052 -0.0060 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.001) 
Out of labor force  -0.207 -0.155 -0.200 -0.263 
  (0.015) (0.042) (0.049) (0.085) 
Out of labor force squared  0.0024 -0.0003 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.0006) (0.0019) (0.0005) (0.002) 
O-level ** 0.270 -0.618 ** 0.394 -0.322 
 (0.096) (0.267) (0.092) (0.227) 
A-level 0.773 0.213 0.531 0.187 
 (0.134) (0.357) (0.132) (0.324) 
Nursing etc ** 0.776 -0.155 ** 0.673 -0.006 
  (0.115) (0.294)  (0.115) (0.283) 
Degree plus  0.700 0.483  0.712 0.672 
  (0.131) (0.36)  (0.132) (0.391) 
No. Children < 5 years old  -1.293 -1.352  -0.555 -0.609 
  (0.053) (0.131)  (0.064) (0.17) 
No. Children 5-<12 years old  -0.174 -0.172  0.115 -0.008 
  (0.041) (0.093)  (0.064) (0.16) 
No. Children 12-16 years old  0.117 0.299  0.105 0.303 
  (0.063) (0.141)  (0.089) (0.205) 
Married  0.024 0.216  0.060 0.290 
  (0.067) (0.18)  (0.069) (0.184) 
Non labor income  -0.029 -0.034  -0.009 -0.014 
    (0.001) (0.008)   (0.003) (0.010) 
  0.729  0.486 
    (0.012)   (0.037) 
Ho: All Coefficients zero  (p-value) 2χ  5414.3 (< 0.001)  3199.6 (< 0.001)
Log Likelihood  -3466.8   -4054.7  
Ho: Urban=rural coefficients  (p-value)  2χ  36.9 (< 0.001)  22.0 (0.056) 
Urban Participation Premium   0.031     0.028  
ρˆ
Equations estimated as Random Effects Probit.  Standard Errors in brackets.  Starred coefficients 
represent significant urban-rural differences in individual coefficients (** 5%,*10%) . All regressions 
included regional and wave dummies.  For the Dynamic equation a separate equation adjusts for initial 
conditions while average experience, time out of the labor force, number of children by age and non-
labor income are included to control for potential correlations between random effects and regressors.  
The initial conditions equation included, own and spouse education level, own and spouse age, number 
and age of children, plus social class of mother and father as regressors.    
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Table 3: Male Participation Estimates 
  Static  Dynamic 
   Urban Rural   Urban Rural 
Constant  2.570 1.915  0.070 0.403 
  (0.251) (0.631)  (0.262) (0.613) 
Lagged working     1.194 1.521 
     (0.107) (0.266) 
Experience  0.094 0.192  -0.155 -0.194 
  (0.017) (0.047)  (0.056) (0.173) 
Experience squared  -0.0026 -0.0044  -0.0012 -0.0020 
  (0.0004) (0.0011)  (0.0003) (0.0011) 
Out of labor force  -0.617 -0.690  -0.485 -0.263 
  (0.035) (0.101)  (0.072) (0.177) 
Out of labor force squared  0.0226 0.0329  0.0082 0.0135 
  (0.0016) (0.0054)  (0.0013) (0.0052) 
O-level ** 0.676 0.495  0.526 0.078 
 (0.146) (0.494)  (0.135) (0.426) 
A-level 1.128 1.089  0.731 0.144 
 (0.185) (0.59)  (0.166) (0.47) 
Nursing etc ** 1.157 1.409  0.734 0.257 
  (0.172) (0.543)  (0.148) (0.462) 
Degree plus  1.522 0.851 * 1.150 0.045 
  (0.198) (0.687)  (0.172) (0.556) 
No. Children < 5 years old  -0.198 -0.439  -0.113 -0.144 
  (0.106) (0.305)  (0.147) (0.528) 
No. Children 5-<12 years old  -0.069 -0.200  0.005 -0.083 
  (0.076) (0.2)  (0.107) (0.24) 
No. Children 12-16 years old  -0.184 -0.445  -0.021 -0.302 
  (0.099) (0.345)  (0.121) (0.322) 
Married  -0.078 0.134  0.144 0.262 
  (0.113) (0.423)  (0.104) (0.354) 
Non labor income * -0.061 -0.134  -0.010 -0.047 
    (0.003) (0.018)   (0.006) (0.024) 
  0.787  0.433 
    (0.016)   (0.057) 
Ho: All Coefficients zero  (p-value) 2χ  4277.7 (< 0.001)  2576.1 (< 0.001) 
Log Likelihood  -1650.1   -2095.9  
Ho: Urban=rural coefficients  (p-value) 2χ  51.5 (< 0.001)  23.0 (0.042) 
Urban Participation Premium   -0.0007     0.008   
ρˆ
Equations estimated as Random Effects Probit.  Standard Errors in brackets.  Starred coefficients 
represent significant urban-rural differences in individual coefficients (** 5%,*10%) . All regressions 
included regional and wave dummies.  For the Dynamic equation a separate equation adjusts for initial 
conditions while average experience, time out of the labor force, number of children by age and non-
labor income are included to control for potential correlations between random effects and regressors. 
The initial conditions equation included, own and spouse education level, own and spouse age, number 
and age of children, plus social class of mother and father as regressors.
Table 4: Female Wage Equation Estimates      
Dependent Variable (wage) eLog         Women
  OLS 
 
 Fixed Effects 
 
 Sample Selection 
     Urban UrbanRural  Rural   Urban Rural
Constant   1.228 1.141   -0.136   1.240 1.168 
       
     
       
      
    
     
    
     
     
       
       
       
  
 (0.077)(0.031)  (0.157)  (0.078)(0.034)
Experience 0.035 0.0630.034 0.068 0.034  0.032
 (0.006)(0.002)  (0.029) (0.031) (0.006)(0.002)
Experience squared  -0.0007 -0.0007  -0.001 -0.001  -0.0007 -0.0007 
 (0.0002)(0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002)(0.0001)
Out of labor force ** -0.027 -0.054 -0.012 -0.033 ** -0.027 -0.055 
(0.003) (0.041)
 
(0.008) (0.003)(0.035) (0.008)
Out of labor force squared  ** 0.0004 0.0024 0.0001 0.001 ** 0.0004 0.0024
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001)
 
(0.001) (0.0004)
 
(0.002)
O-level ** 0.137 0.247 0.002 -0.144 * 0.139 0.243
(0.017) (0.133)(0.05)  (0.017)
 
(0.046) (0.051)
 A-level * 0.250 0.387 * -0.0003 -0.254 0.256 0.377
 (0.072)(0.022)  (0.051) (0.127) (0.073)(0.023)
Nursing etc  0.347 0.346  0.038 -0.160  0.352 0.344 
 (0.066)(0.021)  (0.045) (0.117) (0.066)(0.021)
Degree plus  0.817 0.866  0.072 0.061  0.821 0.868 
    (0.022) (0.073)   (0.070) 
 
(0.149) 
  
 (0.023) 
 
(0.074) 
  0.038
αθσˆ        
      
 (0.009)
 -0.054
ησ eˆ             (0.016) 
Ho: All coefficients zero           (p-value) χ 2  90294.4 (< 0.001)  297.3 (< 0.001)  89095.8 (< 0.001) 
Ho: Zero autocorrelation           (p-value) χ 2  501.5 (< 0.001)  338.6 (< 0.001)  87.03 (< 0.001) 
Ho: Urban= Rural coefficients  (p-value) χ 2  41.5 (< 0.001)  13.86 (0.129)  42.4 (< 0.001) 
Urban Wage Premium    0.063     0.053    0.064  
2
9χ
Standard Errors (in brackets) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. In the sample selection model they are adjusted for the two-step estimation process. Starred 
coefficients represent significant urban-rural differences in individual coefficients (** 5%,*10%).  All regressions include a common set of regional and wave dummies. 
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Table 5: Male Wage Equation Estimates 
Dependent Variable (wage) eLog         Men
  OLS 
 
 Fixed Effects 
 
 Sample Selection 
      Urban Rural Urban Rural   Urban Rural
Constant   1.251 1.360   -0.112   1.273 1.373 
          
       
      
       
      
      
      
       
        
        
         
         
          
         
          
  
(0.036) (0.08) (0.140) (0.039) (0.08)
Experience
 
** 0.040 0.023 ** 0.076 0.051 ** 0.039 0.022
(0.003) (0.006) (0.023) (0.024) (0.003) (0.006)
Experience squared
 
** -0.0007 -0.0003 ** -0.001 0.000 ** -0.0007 -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Out of labor force 
 
** -0.056 -0.100 -0.106 -0.157 ** -0.050 -0.097 
(0.006) (0.015) (0.034) (0.052) (0.007) (0.015)
Out of labor force squared  
 
** 0.0026 0.0049 0.009 0.012 **
 
0.0023 0.0050
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.0005)
 
(0.0009)
O-level
 
** 0.224 0.198 -0.031 -0.010 0.219 0.201
(0.021) (0.054) (0.048) (0.110) (0.022) (0.054)
A-level
 
* 0.321 0.438 -0.035 0.110 0.314 0.432
(0.025) (0.073) (0.053) (0.111) (0.026) (0.073)
Nursing etc
 
0.449 0.477 0.023 0.098 0.443 0.475
(0.023) (0.056) (0.045) (0.090) (0.024) (0.056)
Degree plus 0.828 0.822 0.179 0.228 0.817 0.818
    (0.026) (0.077)   (0.076) 
 
(0.131) 
  
  (0.027) 
 
(0.077) 
  0.015
αθσˆ         
       
(0.013)
-0.104
ησ eˆ              (0.033) 
Ho: All coefficients zero            (p-value)χ 2  91063.0 (< 0.001)  413.7 (< 0.001)  91730.3 (< 0.001) 
Ho: Zero autocorrelation           (p-value)χ 2          
         
533.4 (< 0.001) 363.0 (< 0.001) 30.1 (0.090)
Ho: Urban= Rural coefficients   (p-value)χ 2 24.2 (0.004) 16.0 (0.066) 24.7 (0.003)
Urban Wage Premium    0.037      0.034     0.038  
2
9χ
Standard Errors (in brackets) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. In the sample selection model they are adjusted for the two-step estimation process. Starred 
coefficients represent significant urban-rural differences in individual coefficients (** 5%,*10%).  All regressions include a common set of regional and wave dummies.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Wage Equation Residual Covariances 
 
  Women    Men  
Covariance OLS  OLS 
    
Fixed 
Effects 
Sample 
Selection    
Fixed 
Effects 
Sample 
Selection
),cov( 1−itit uu
))
 0.124 -0.001 0.005  0.136 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) 
),cov( 2−itit uu
))
 0.112 -0.008 0.002  0.128 -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) 
),cov( 3−itit uu
))
 0.104 -0.014 -0.002  0.121 -0.011 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) 
),cov( 4−itit uu
))
 0.098 -0.017 0.008  0.114 -0.014 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) 
),cov( 5−itit uu
))
 0.089 -0.023 0.005  0.113 -0.014 0.018 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) 
),cov( 6−itit uu
))
 0.094 -0.014 0.025  0.112 -0.012 0.004 
  (0.008) (0.003) (0.008)   (0.01) (0.002) (0.009) 
Standard Errors in brackets 
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Table 7: Predicted Urban Participation and Wage premiums 
 
 Participation  Wages 
     
Sample  
Selection 
 Fixed Effects 
   
Sample  
  Urban Rural 
  Urban Rural  Urban Rural
All  ** 0.028 0.029 ** 0.064 0.067  0.053 0.060 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003)
Married/Cohabiting 0.021 0.019 ** 0.088 0.082  0.055 0.043 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.006)
Single   0.025 0.056 ** 0.036 0.011  - - 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.003) (0.009)    
All  * 0.008 0.010 ** 0.038 0.024 * 0.034 0.013 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.004)
Married/Cohabiting ** 0.010 0.010 ** 0.043 0.046 * -0.016 -0.042 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.006)
Single   -0.058 -0.038  ** 0.013 -0.028  - - 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) (0.018)    
Bootstrapped Standard Errors in brackets.  Participation results for All women and Men based on 
dynamic RE Probit estimates presented in Tables 2 and  3.  Other participation results based on 
identically structured RE Probit estimations for these sub-samples.  The participation premium is 
calculated as the difference in the average participation prediction using the urban and rural coefficients 
for urban or rural characteristics. The wage premium estimates for women and men are based on the 
appropriate results from Tables 4 and 5, with other estimates obtained from identically structured wage 
estimations.    The fixed effects results for single men and women are omitted because collinearity 
prevented the Table 4/5 specification being estimated.  The wage premium is calculated as the 
difference in the average offer wage prediction using the urban and rural coefficients for urban or rural 
characteristics.  Starred values indicate that the joint hypothesis that all urban and rural coefficients are 
identical is rejected in the model used to generate the predictions (** 5%,*10%).   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Sample Selection Wage Estimates under Alternative Exclusion 
Restrictions.  
 
  Women  Men  
    Urban Rural   Urban Rural 
Constant  1.238 1.179  1.248 1.338 
  (0.035) (0.085)  (0.039) (0.081) 
Experience  0.036 0.031 ** 0.032 0.013 
  (0.002) (0.006)  (0.003) (0.007) 
Experience squared  -0.001 -0.001 ** -0.001 -0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Out of labor force ** -0.025 -0.052 ** -0.048 -0.092 
 (0.002) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.015) 
Out of labor force squared ** 0.0004 0.002 ** 0.002 0.005 
 (0.0001) (0.0004)  (0.0005) (0.001) 
O-level * 0.141 0.243  0.209 0.191 
 (0.017) (0.051)  (0.022) (0.055) 
A-level * 0.246 0.376 * 0.315 0.445 
 (0.023) (0.073)  (0.026) (0.070) 
Nursing etc  0.349 0.345  0.438 0.488 
  (0.021) (0.066)  (0.023) (0.055) 
Degree plus  0.811 0.872  0.807 0.820 
  (0.023) (0.075)  (0.027) (0.076) 
No. Children < 5 years old  0.024 0.022  0.019 0.023 
  (0.019) (0.048)  (0.014) (0.037) 
No. Children 5-<12 years old  -0.063 -0.043  0.019 0.029 
  (0.010) (0.022)  (0.011) (0.023) 
No. Children 12-16 years old  -0.060 0.009  0.015 0.055 
  (0.012) (0.035)  (0.016) (0.041) 
Married  0.032 0.013  0.130 0.120 
  (0.014) (0.044)  (0.017) (0.053) 
Non labor income  -0.0005 -0.001  -0.001 0.002 
   (0.001) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.006) 
αθσˆ   0.040  0.016 
   (0.010)  (0.013) 
ησ eˆ   -0.054  -0.107 
  (0.019)  (0.034) 
Ho: All coefficients zero            (p-value) χ 2  91205.2 (< 0.001)  95967.9 (< 0.001)
Ho: Zero autocorrelation           (p-value) χ 2  75.4 (< 0.001)  26.6 (0.185) 
Ho: Urban= Rural coefficients   (p-value) χ 2  31.7 (< 0.001)  24.8 (< 0.001)
Urban Wage Premium    0.068     0.033  
2
9χ
Standard Errors (in brackets) are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for 
the two-step estimation process. Starred coefficients represent significant urban-rural differences in 
individual coefficients (** 5%,*10%).  Both regressions include a common set of regional and wave 
dummies. 
 
